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1 Introduction 
The emergence of a small number of economies from the ‘South’ or the ‘Third World’ 
as important players in the global economy has attracted much attention. All the four 
economies being discussed here (China, Inda, Brazil, and South Africa – CIBS) were 
thought to be hopeless ‘basket cases’ within the second half of the last century though 
for different reasons. India and China were plagued by famines and economic policies, 
which while radical from a nationalist perspective, were driving their economies into 
stagnation (India) or excessive political and economic volatility (China). South Africa 
had the seemingly unsolvable problem of apartheid, and even its economy was highly 
state owned and corporatist but in favour of the privileged white minority. Brazil had 
chalked up impressive growth rates in the period 1951-1980 albeit under authoritarian 
regimes and yet it did not sustain its growth spurt in the later twenty years. There has 
been some revival in growth in the twenty-first century. 
Since the 1990s, their story has changed and we are contemplating their rise in the GDP 
ranks (PPP yet, but soon actual dollars) in the world. Growth rates have been 
spectacular in China now for some twenty five years, and in India, since the reform 
process of 1991, the economy has achieved a growth rate of GDP that on average is 
double the average of the thirty years between 1950 and 1980, and in the last five years 
treble. South Africa and Brazil have not had an equally rapid acceleration. They are 
already middle income countries and they are noticed more for their potential than 
actual performance in recent years. Brazil’s size makes it a likely candidate as an 
‘engine’ and South Africa’s leading position in Africa makes it a country worthy of 
inclusion in this exclusive club. 
2  Some basics about CIBS 
The four economies even as they share their status as ‘new miracle economies’ or 
‘already emerged economies’ are very different in their nature, their histories and their 
factor endowments. Two are Southern hemisphere and two Northern ones. 
In broad macro terms of area and population, China is the top on both counts with 9.6 
million square kilometres (m km2) and a population of 1.3 billion. Brazil is the next 
largest in terms of area with 8.5 m km2 and a population of 184 million. India is the third 
largest with 3.7 m km2 and a population of 1.1 billion while South Africa has an area of 
1.2 m km2 and a population of 47 million. China has 136 people per km2, Brazil 22, 
India 297, and South Africa 39. Thus there is a sharp contrast in the people/land ratio as 
between the two Northern hemisphere economies and the two Southern ones. There are 
other contrasts as well. 
The contrast in initial endowments means that the two pairs of economies have to 
follow different strategies. Growth theories have normally used a two factor production 
function with capital and labour. But it may be that if we take a three factor approach 
with land added to the two standard inputs, one may be able to think out a better growth 
strategy. Thus for example in land rich/people scarce economies, the real wage tends to 
be high. They face a labour shortage which is paradoxical in what we think of as Third 
World economies. But our ideas are shaped by the surplus labour Asian economies and 
not land rich/people scarce African and South American ones. Given such labour 
constraint, in order to induce people to take up paid wage work, you have to equip them   2
with sufficient human and non-human capital to match their productivity to their real 
wage. 
This was the experience of the US economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
There the high real wage of ‘free’ Americans was diluted by slaves whose lower 
implicit real wage made labour intensive agriculture such as cotton growing profitable. 
But in the slave free states the growth pattern was capital intensive. Later again in the 
second half of the nineteenth century migration from Europe softened the real wage 
constraint, but even then large amounts of capital were required to employ the 
newcomers. 
Brazil and South Africa face the real wage constraint albeit modified by some 
institutional barriers. During the nineteenth century, in South Africa the policy adopted 
to attract rural labour into mines was a head tax which had to be paid in money terms. 
This compelled at least one member of the household to work away from the farm. But 
this was resisted until the policy became more drastic. In the early colonial period, in 
Spanish South America, similar inducements had to be provided to make the ‘Indians’ 
work for the market economy. In Brazil, it was the import of slaves which kept the local 
economy relatively free of the labour constraint. At the time of its independence in the 
early nineteenth century 30 per cent of Brazil’s population was slave. 
In the twentieth century, apartheid kept the black real wages artificially below the white 
wages. Now with the new situation, black real wage has implicitly gone up. South 
Africa witnesses the simultaneous situation of unemployment among the black South 
Africans especially in urban areas, and complaints that there is in-migration from 
surrounding African nations whose people are undercutting the South African blacks. 
The need in such a situation is to enhance the human capital of the black workforce and 
adopt capital intensive activities that also require high human capital. Brazil has a 
similar problem with urban unemployment and underemployment. While agriculture 
and the resource extraction industries provide the mainstay of export earnings, there is 
still an awful wastage of human capital; puzzling in an economy that faces a labour 
constraint. But what this implies is that many manufacturing activities which are 
feasible in land poor/people abundant economies – low tech textile etc. – are not 
economically viable for the land rich countries. They need to upgrade their labour force, 
equip it with capital and seek feasible medium tech or high tech manufacturing 
activities. They could also import labour from labour surplus economies. 
The situation of the Northern hemisphere economies is altogether different and much 
more amenable to the standard analysis. They have abundant cheap labour and lack 
capital. In this respect China has managed to transfer large parts of its rural population 
to urban areas thus keeping the effective price of labour low. Capital is generated by the 
high domestic savings rate plus foreign direct investment (FDI). This has resulted in 
rapid growth fuelled by exports of manufacture, especially at the low tech end. China’s 
land reforms also helped raise labour productivity on the farms and made the transfer of 
surplus feasible. 
India has not had a successful land reform to the extent of China. Productivity in 
agriculture both per person and per acre remains low. India has also passed labour laws 
that inhibit hiring and firing in the organized (i.e. greater than 100-employee firms) 
sector. This has meant that Indian manufacturing is a medium to high tech niche activity 
but does not generate large scale employment. India has in effect made its abundant   3
cheap labour expensive by institutional rigidities. Thus employment in informal urban 
sector activities and lately in information technology (IT) activities (typically small 
firms) has grown. The bulk of the population is still in rural underemployment and 
represents a potential force for extra growth if only reform of the labour laws could 
unleash it. 
The two Northern economies are very old and indeed two of the oldest continuous urban 
civilizations and were bywords for populous and prosperous countries until the middle 
of the eighteenth century. Their share of global GDP (given the imperfections of such 
figures is unavoidable) matched their share of the world population in 1700. They 
declined during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century and by the 1960s 
thought to be ‘basket cases’ (Desai 2005 for details).1 If anything their wealth 
inequalities are lower today than they were, say, a hundred years or two hundred years 
ago. Recently income inequality in China is reported to have gone up and so has wealth 
inequality but relative to the Southern hemisphere economies these inequalities are 
modest (especially since land ownership is not very unequal).  
The Southern hemisphere economies are ‘younger’ in centuries relative to the Northern 
hemisphere economies. Brazil and South Africa had very small populations before 
1500 CE common era and especially a very large resources/population ratio however 
one may value the resources. Their local populations were overwhelmed by settlers 
from Europe (Portugal (Brazil) and the Netherlands and later the British (South Africa)) 
and added to by African slaves (Brazil more than South Africa) or indentured labour 
(South Africa). South Africa’s experience of apartheid was unique in the modern age 
and has only been overcome in the last dozen or so years. 
Both were seen as mineral resource rich areas where the main problem was to generate 
sufficient labour supply. South Africa was also largely rural with small concentrations 
around mining towns or ports and very late, i.e. twentieth century, development of 
urbanization. South Africa was never a ‘poor’ or ‘underdeveloped’ country and even 
today is the richest in sub-Saharan Africa. But it has an immensely unequal distribution 
of income, wealth (land but also other assets) as well as human development scores. 
Brazil had a higher level of urbanization relative to South Africa even by the late 
eighteenth century. Rio, Salvador and Sao Paulo were thriving towns and the bulk of the 
population was concentrated around the eastern coast. Agriculture was carried out in 
large land holdings and mining activities were around small concentrations of opulation. 
Brazil has always had an unequal distribution of wealth (especially land) and income as 
well. These inequalities are mapped by race or ethnic origins, though within each ethnic 
group there are inequalities as well. 
Thus, the one major difference between the two pairs of economies is that in the very 
long run – epochal sense – the Northern hemisphere economies are resuming  their 
rightful place in the global ranks. In 1500, they were the two richest economies – 
though again in total income terms with a lot of inequality – and indeed up to 1700 
continued to be so. They entered a two hundred year long decline as a result of the 
impact of the rise of the West and Imperial conquest (India) or Imperial domination 
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Washington DC, and Palgrave Macmillan: New York.   4
(China). The nineteenth century was better for China than India but in the first half of 
the twentieth century both stagnated, China did worse than India. In 1975, they were 
equal pegging in terms of their relative position of income and population shares in the 
global economy. It is in the last thirty five years that China has outstripped India. Again 
in the last five years, there has been a growth spurt in India and it is narrowing the 
distance in terms of growth rates relative to China (Nayyar 2007;2 Desai 2005). 
One speculative question then is – is there an ‘epochal wave’ that India and China are 
experiencing and if so will they ‘catch up’ and regain their relative ranking in the global 
economy, and, if so, when? Of course there are no ‘cycles’ since we can barely observe 
one wave over three or four centuries. Even Kondratieff cycles with 50 year periods are 
difficult enough to verify, and there is scepticism about Kuznets cycles of 25 years. But 
whether a cycle or not, the speculation will not go away. So I would like to pursue that 
here. 
For the Southern hemisphere economies this is not an issue. They were not high in the 
global league in any case. (The only Southern American economy that was high in the 
global rank is Argentina. Colin Clark in his pioneering work The Conditions of 
Economic Progress ranked Argentina as one of the top five economies. Unlikely as it 
seems today, in 1913, Argentina’s per capita income was just under half of the USA’s 
and even in 1950 about 35 per cent. By 1989, it was under a quarter and of course it has 
been worse since.) Their share of world income kept pace with their share of world 
population, which in any case did not amount to more than around 2 per cent each. They 
are already upper-middle income countries while China is lower-middle income and 
India is low income. Yet it is useful to carry the Southern pair economies as 
comparators for the Northern pair. 
3  Growth dynamics in a Maddisonian perspective 
In very broad (almost Maddisonian) terms, if the Iberian exploration in the last decade 
of the fifteenth century inaugurated a Global Economy (or World System), then for the 
first half of around 250 years, it was the Iberian countries – Spain and Portugal – who 
were dominant powers. They had a lead in naval warfare technology having light 
manoueverable ships that could carry guns for long journeys. Their interest was in 
surplus extraction and transfer rather than transforming the economies’ production 
possibilities. Thus it was the mineral exports, especially gold and silver, which were the 
main activities pursued. Agriculture developed to feed the imported slave population 
plus the original inhabitants who had been deprived of their means of livelihood. South 
Africa had only a slight encounter with this phase of the World System. The Portuguese 
got to Angola in the fifteenth century but for a hundred years were satisfied with only 
coastal contact. Later in the sixteenth century they traded with interior tribal leaders, 
slaves for European goods, guns and trinkets. The Dutch began to colonize the Cape 
region in the early seventeenth century and pushed the Portuguese away. Their interest 
at this juncture was in farming the somewhat unrewarding but ample land available. 
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During this first phase, 1500-1750, India and China were big trading economies. There 
was extensive maritime trade across the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The 
western limits of maritime trade were the Red Sea and the Gulf. Portuguese naval 
expeditions went around the Cape of Good Hope and opened a new trading route to 
Asia, thus removing the barrier due to the gap between the Red Sea and Mediterranean 
which later became the Suez Canal. They came in search of spices but they – and later 
the British, Dutch, Danes and French – joined the Portuguese to take part in the newly 
expanded trade. Besides spices they also traded silk and cotton textiles as well as food-
grains, both intra-Asia and to Europe. This phase was ‘trade without dominion’ as far as 
Asia was concerned. There was an export surplus that Asia enjoyed with Europe and 
this was financed by the treasure from South America. The treasure came either directly 
from Iberia to Asia or via Western Europe with which the Iberian peninsula also had a 
trade deficit. 
The next phase belongs to North Western European countries who displaced the Iberian 
countries in Asia and North America. The Netherlands and Britain who led in terms of 
governance reform, financial revolution, and, later in the eighteenth century for Britain, 
industrial revolution occupied India and Indonesia (the Netherlands East Indies as it was 
then called). The French lost out in India but went on to colonize Indo-China (as it was 
called until recently). It was in this phase, 1750-1950, that China and India lost their 
leads. In this phase the industrial revolution came as a major shock, displacing the 
advantage that Asia had in textiles. This phase had trade with dominion and the pattern 
of trade changed with textiles becoming an import rather than an export item for Asia. 
The inflow of treasure to finance India’s trade surplus was replaced by an Indian 
revenue surplus and a triangular trade was set up exchanging Indian opium (a 
government monopoly) for Chinese tea and the sale proceeds from the tea were sent to 
London as treasure. 
In this second phase of globalization, the pattern of trade, capital and labour flows 
became restricted to individual metropolis-periphery canals – British, French, Dutch, 
etc., rather than fully global as before. The direction of capital flows was via London 
mainly for North America and the white British Empire as well as much of South 
America and Asia. Labour flows were within the imperial domains, and trade was not 
free but encumbered by tacit or explicit ‘imperial preference’. The fortunes of India 
were tied to the dynamics of the British economy. China was tied more to Britain than 
any other imperial country but its twentieth history was plagued by war with Japan and 
the breakdown of unified rule from the centre. The stagnation in the twentieth century 
that both China and India experienced was much due to the slowing down of the British 
economy after the third quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Brazil was under Portuguese domination even after its decline as a European power. 
Even after independence in the early nineteenth century, it had Portuguese kings until in 
the 1880s it became a republic. South Africa was settled by the British after 1820 as a 
colony in Cape and Natal while the Dutch (Boers) moved into Orange Free State and 
Transvaal. After the Boer War at the turn of the century, the Union of South Africa was 
born in 1910 which became a republic in 1961. Both continued to be precious metals 
and mineral exporters and to a smaller extent agricultural exporters. Labour shortage 
continued to plague them, and immigration either voluntary or as indentured or slave 
labour continued throughout the nineteenth century.   6
Thus we have two economies that are long settled with a low resources/people ratio and 
two with a very high ratio. China and India are relatively labour rich and Brazil and 
South Africa land rich. But much more than the difference in factor endowments is their 
history. For India and China, the major drive in the last sixty years has been restoring 
the dignity of the nation in the international sphere and preserving the territorial 
integrity of the nation-state. These political goals dominate the economic ones of rising 
per capita income and poverty elimination. India and China unlike Brazil and South 
Africa see themselves as potential global players displaced from their rightful place by 
two centuries of western domination. They are thus much more liable to spend money 
on armaments and willing to go to war either internally or externally to preserve what 
they believe is their rightful territorial domain. India has in addition an internal dynamic 
of inclusion to give social status equality to groups that have been downtrodden for 
centuries, which is a major objective of its political and economic policies. 
4  India and China as growth engines 
Much of the growth in China and India has been input driven. Labour productivity has 
risen mainly by transferring labour from low productivity sectors to high productivity 
one. Yet total factor productivity growth (TFPG) has been modest. There have been no 
remarkable innovations coming out of the two countries, which by their sheer size have 
made a big impact on trade and investment flows (though China is registering many 
more patents than India and is one of the leading countries in patents ranking). They 
have taken advantage of the climate for freer trade, reformed their trade regimes to take 
advantage of market access to developed countries and taken over the manufacture and 
exports of ‘mature’ industrial products. There are some differences between the two. 
China has spread its industrial growth across the spectrum from low to medium and a 
little high tech while India has focussed on medium tech, skill intensive industrial 
growth. China has relied on under-consumption, high savings plus a large FDI 
contribution and export growth while India has relied on domestic consumption growth, 
low FDI and moderate export growth. In this respect, a crude aggregative calculation 
would reveal that China gets around 10-12 per cent GDP growth rate from around 50 
per cent of GDP invested (45 per cent domestic savings plus 5 per cent FDI) while India 
gets between 7 per cent to 9 per cent growth from 30 per cent to 35 per cent investment 
(mostly domestic savings with a small 1 to 2 per cent FDI). China is thus less capital 
efficient than India. This may partly be due to China’s sectoral growth composition with 
a great amount of investment in infrastructure while India has underinvested in that 
sector. But the rate of return on equity is also higher in India than in China. Thus the 
capital intensive nature of Chinese growth pattern is worrying as is its material intensity. 
China’s population growth is slowing and its population may age faster than India’s. 
China’s gender imbalance is worse than India’s though it is bad in both countries. India 
falls behind China in infrastructure, in primary and secondary education and health but 
has had a relative lead on China in higher education and the ability to use English. 
Despite many episodes of sub-national revolts across India – Kashmir, Punjab, Assam 
and Nagaland, India has not experienced a period of excessive political volatility as 
China did during the Cultural Revolution. The opacity of the Communist Party decision 
making process makes doing business in China a costly process though its dominance 
delivers quick results. In India, the decision process is open and slow and reversible 
under populist pressure (example of special export zones and of the problems faced by 
the West Bengal government with acquiring land for industrial development in recent   7
months) and hence any investment once committed can often be worthless since 
concessions won with difficulty (and a large bribe) can be lost. 
In all current discussions, it is taken for granted that this process will continue with the 
inexorable logic of compound interest rate growth. This may well be so but I wish to 
spend the rest of this paper on pointing out what could go wrong with such simple 
scenarios. The ‘snags’ are external and internal. 
4.1 External  ‘snags’ 
At present there seems to be a symbiosis between Western capital outflows and Asian 
need for investment. In return, manufacturing exports from Asia keeps Western 
inflation low. Western countries have had to restructure their economies away from low 
tech mature manufacturing products towards high tech R&D intensive products and 
services. This has led to a massive churning of the labour force with the losers being 
low skilled and semiskilled manual manufacturing male workers in the developed 
countries. This process can go on only if the Asian countries buy the goods and services 
the West has to sell and the debate on China’s exchange rate policy shows that there are 
limits to this process. China underconsumes and accumulates its export surplus. The 
USA overconsumes and runs a capital outflow to finance its excess consumption. Since 
China does not recycle its accumulated surplus back into global demand, there is a 
perception that China is not playing fair. This is the nub of the debate on the exchange 
rate. As yet the numbers are small in relation to global flows but with the forthcoming 
2008 presidential elections in the USA, this ‘snag’ will loom large as a possible 
disrupter of smooth growth. China’s sovereign wealth fund has begun to recycle some 
of the accumulated reserves and this will ease the burden a little. This is much needed 
especially in light of the deep financial crisis of late 2007/early 2008. 
On the side of the four emerging nations, WTO negotiations loom large as an example 
of the lack of symmetry in international trade negotiations. The agricultural subsidies 
given by the USA and EU and their insistence on the Singapore conditions have held up 
the resolution of the Doha Round. This is another ‘snag’ that may hinder smooth 
developments. 
There are geopolitical considerations that also hover in the background. China is seen as 
the only nation state today that can challenge American supremacy in the near future. 
On the one hand, in arrangements such as the Shanghai process Russia and China club 
together, which worries the USA. The USA-India nuclear agreement (yet to go through 
both countries’ parliaments) is a countermove to the Shanghai process by the USA. 
India and China have an unsettled border dispute though they have agreed to negotiate 
peacefully. Japan’s attitude is ambivalent about the rise of China, and any possible 
reunification of the two parts of Korea will also influence Chinese perceptions of 
national security. For China, the Taiwan issue remains unresolved. 
India is in a neighbourhood that has many failed or potentially failing states. Sri Lanka 
has had a civil war raging for 25 years, which has claimed the life of one Indian Prime 
Minister. Pakistan and India have had four wars and now with both countries having a 
nuclear capability, one can only hope that future relations will be peaceable. Pakistan 
itself is under pressure from Al Qaeda and the Taleban militants on its Afghan border. 
Its transition to democracy is a fraught process as the recent assassination of Benazir   8
Bhutto has shown. Myanmar on India’s eastern border is still a repressive regime with 
an uncertain future and Nepal has just had a revolution albeit with India’s tacit approval. 
4.2 Internal  ‘snags’ 
India faces the tricky problems of inclusion with its dalits and backward castes, as well 
as its large Muslim minority. These are struggles for social status equality as much as 
economic betterment. There is a large and growing army of Maoists – the Naxalites as 
they are called – which exploit tribal and other marginal groups’ discontent with 
exclusion of the economic processes that could benefit them. One sixth of India’s 
districts have a substantial Naxalite presence. While this is not a long term threat, it is a 
substantial short and medium term problem. India has also had sub-nationalist 
movements over the last sixty years – Kashmir, Punjab, Nagaland, Assam – which have 
had to be dealt with ruthlessly and some of which, such as Nagaland and Kashmir, are 
not as yet solved. 
For China, the lack of the rule of law is a problem. Internal unrest has taken many forms 
mainly in rural areas where people have found they have lost their property without 
proper compensation. This unrest is spreading to urban areas as well. There is religious 
dissent in the form of the Falun Gong and Christian groups who are demanding greater 
religious tolerance. Again it is unlikely that these threats are likely to cause a serious 
rupture to the regime but they will grow and not just go away. China may need to relax 
its underconsumptionist stance and allow greater consumption freedoms to its 
population much as India has done to divert some of the unrest. 
For the other two countries, there are no external snags as such. Their problems are 
internal, such as the problems of status equality for groups within their populations and 
the overwhelming problem of inequalities of wealth and lifetime opportunities. In a 
sense the problem of inclusion that India is tackling through its democratic process is 
also the problem facing the two Southern hemisphere countries. If Brazil could upgrade 
the education of its poor people, it could harness the additional human capital for a 
growth spurt. Similarly for South Africa, eliminating the economic and social distance 
between the black majority and the white minority will be a growth enhancing policy. 
5 Conclusion 
The southern engines of global growth are a reality. They herald a new shape to the 
twenty-first global economy. But one should not take their sustained growth for granted. 
Each country needs to consciously pursue policies that will overcome some of the 
internal and external snags that are mentioned above. One thing is certain, that the half 
millennium inaugurated by the ‘discoveries’ of Christopher Columbus and Vasco De 
Gama has now ended. A new millennium will see a new global economy with a smaller 
disproportionality between populations shares and income shares. 